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Introduction
Controversy regarding the impact and desirability of taxing
unmined coal interests in the same manner as other real property
provided the impetus for this article. Deciding whether unmined
coal should be taxed like other real property, taxed at special
rates or not taxed at all requires making some value decisions.
The purpose of this article is to examine the existing tax system
to ascertain the possible impacts of taxation of unmined min-
erals, which in turn should make clearer the value choices which
must be made by the legislature when it decides whether or not
to change the existing tax system.
In order to add perspective to the issues and to examine
constitutional, legal and traditional impediments and limitations
to change, the article begins with a brief summary of property
taxation in Kentucky and the historical development of the un-
mined minerals taxes in Kentucky. Part II of the article attempts
to ascertain existing law on the subject at a time when the current
law is being tested in the courts. Part III examines the issues
relating to implementation of a tax on unmined minerals, such
as valuation, the effects of the Broad Form Deed Act, and the
impact on farms and minerals other than coal. These implemen-
tation issues, although rarely discussed by proponents or oppo-
nents of taxation of unmined coal, can have a profound effect
on the determination of the amount of tax to be generated, the
incidence of the tax, and concomitantly the fairness of the tax.
Part IV of the article utilizes the assumptions and conclusions
from Part III to assess the economic impact of the tax on
taxpayers and on the revenues of the state. It concludes that
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prior scholarly attempts to estimate economic impact have been
erroneous due to the failure to consider the implementation
issues discussed in Part III.
I. THE KENTUCKY AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX
Kentucky's present property tax is provided for under sec-
tions 170 through 174 of the Kentucky Constitution. Under
section 171, the general assembly has the power to provide an
annual tax on property which "shall be levied and collected for
public purposes only and shall be uniform upon all property of
the same class."' Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution gives
the general assembly the power "to divide property into classes
and to determine what class or classes of property shall be
subject to local taxation." ' 2 Under section 172, all non-exempt
property must be assessed at its fair cash value, which is the
price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale.'
An exception to this fair cash value rule is found in section
172A. This section states that the assessment value of agricultural
and horticultural land is determined according to its value for
such agricultural or horticultural use rather than its fair cash
value. 4 The general assembly has the power to provide for rea-
sonable differences in the tax rate within different areas of the
same taxing districts "on that class of property which includes
the surface of the land." 5 Futhermore, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky has held that the purpose of section 172A is to allow
a lack of uniformity, both as to the tax rate and the valuation.
of the affected land. 6 The court also held that the power to
provide for a different tax rate is not limited to agricultural or
horticultural land, but includes urban land as well.'
The general assembly has acted on the powers granted to it
by the Kentucky Constitution through Title XI of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes. Title XI provides a comprehensive scheme for
Ky. CONST. § 171.
2 Id.
KY. CONST. § 172.
4 Ky. CONST. § 172A.
Id.
City of Louisville v. Fiscal Court, 623 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Ky. 1981).
7 Id.
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levying, assessing, and implementing an ad valorem tax on non-
exempt property.
In general, all property, real or personal, is subject to prop-
erty tax unless specifically exempted under section 170 of the
Kentucky Constitution. Under section 170, exempt property in-
cludes property used for religious worship or as a parsonage,
places of burial not held for profit, public charities, educational
institutions, public libraries, household goods, crops grown in
the year the assessment was made, and real property used as a
permanent residence of an owner who is at least 65 years old or
is totally disabled.8 The general assembly may also authorize any
city or town to exempt manufacturing establishments from local
taxes for up to five years as an incentive to locate there. 9 These
exemptions are exclusive and any other exemption is void.' 0
All real property not exempted by section 170 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution is subject to taxation." The rate at which
such property is taxed is provided for in Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) section 132.020. Generally, real property is sub-
ject to tax at a rate of 22 cents per $100 of assessed value, 2 but
unmined coal is subject to tax at a rate of 1/10 cent per $100
of assessed value.' 3 The real property rate is subject to change
each year, because the rate is adjusted each year to the extent
necessary to make the present year's aggregate tax 4% greater
than it was in the immediately preceding year. 14 Moreover, the
Attorney General has held that the increase in a particular county
is not limited to 4%," but that the increase for the entire state
is limited to 4°04.16 The 4% limit on state increases does not
apply to increases due to the addition of new property to the
tax rolls. 17
1 Ky. CONST. § 170 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
9Id.
i rd.
" KY. REV. STAT. § 132.190(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
,2 KRS § 132.020(1) provides a 31 & 1/2 cent rate but this rate has been rolled
back by the 4% limitation to 22 cents pursuant to the 1984 property tax bill.
13 KRS § 132.020(5) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
KRS § 132.020(7) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
83 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 17 (Ky. Jan. 1983).
16 Id.
1 KRS §§ 132.020(7), 132.010 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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The general assembly has determined that some property
shall be taxable only at the state level. 8 Other than those types
of property specifically listed in KRS section 132.200, all prop-
erty is subject to taxation at the state level as well as by the
county, city, school or other taxing district in which the property
is located. 9 Among those types of property taxable only by the
state is "unmined coal and any interest therein, in whatever
form held." ' 20 Local taxing districts can only tax coal in a spe-
cially voted levy, the purpose of which is to retire bonds issued
prior to 1977.21 If the property is subject to local taxation, such
taxes operate almost identically to the state real property tax.
The major difference is the maximum limit on county, city and
local taxing district tax rates.22
The property tax is administered under a two-tier system. At
the state level is the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet 23 and at the
county level are the Property Valuation Administrators (PVAs).
The Revenue Cabinet has the power to "make rules and regu-
lations, and direct proceedings and actions, for the administra-
tion and enforcement of all tax laws of this state."24 The Revenue
Cabinet has the power to assess the value of distilled spirits, 25
property of public service corporations, 26 capital stocks of do-
mestic savings and loans,27 and taxable capital28 and reserves of
domestic life insurance companies. 29 However, the Revenue Cab-
inet must rely on the assessments of the PVAs to determine the
value of all other property subject to state ad valorem property
tax.30
11 KRS § 132.200 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
19 Id.
KRS § 132.200(11) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
21 KRS § 132.203 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
22 Ky. CONST. § 157.
23 KRS § 12.250 (1985) (prior to July 13, 1984, the Kentucky Department of
Revenue).
2- KRS § 131.130(1) (1984).
25 KRS § 132.160 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
- KRS § 136.120(3) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
27 KRS § 136.290 (1982).
KRS § 136.320(a) (1982).
" KRS § 136.320(c) (1982).
- KRS § 132.420(1) (1982).
1985]
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The PVAs are the second tier of the system and they operate
at the county level. There must be one PVA for each county.3
The major duty of the PVA is as follows "subject to the
direction, instruction and supervision of the [Revenue Cabinet],
[the PVA shall] make the assessment of all property in his county
except as otherwise provided, prepare property assessment re-
cords, and have such other powers and duties relating to assess-
ment as may be prescribed by law or by the [revenue cabinet].
' '3 2
The PVA also prepares property tax rolls,33 and maintains a list
of real property additions and deletions to that tax roll, for all
taxable property within his county.
34
Thus, the Revenue Cabinet has broad powers with regard to
taxation of property. It levies the taxes on property, it has
supervisory powers over the PVAs, and it has broad administra-
tive powers in the taxation area. The PVAs, however, determine
the value for tax purposes of almost all the property in the state.
Assessment presents recurring problems in the administration
of the property tax. The PVA cannot willfully or intentionally
assess one person's property at a lower or higher relative weight
than he assesses the same class of property of another person.35
Furthermore, the PVA "shall make every effort, through visits
with the taxpayer, personal inspection of the property, from
records, from his own knowledge, from information in property
schedules, and from such other evidence as he may be able to
obtain, to locate, identify, and assess property. ' 36 The PVA is
required to revalue all real property within his county on an
annual basis and to make a physical examination of the real
property at least once every two years.3 7
In the recent case of Dolan v. Land,3" the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that even though the deputy valuator had viewed the
property the assessment was invalid.3 9 The majority opinion
3, KRS § 132.380(1) (1982).
32 KRS § 132.420(1) (1982).
33 KRS § 132.530(1) (1982).
- KRS § 132.015 (1982).
31 KRS § 132.450(1) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
Id.
37 KRS § 132.690(1) (1982)..
38 667 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1984).
3 Id. at 688.
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noted that the deputy's view of the property was for the sole
purpose of comparing the property to a contour map.40 The
Court held that "the deputy valuators did not physically inspect
the land."14  Furthermore, the formula used by the PVA to
determine the property's value "failed to consider the particular
individual characteristics of specific farm property. ' 42 Arguably,
the degree of physical inspection required may vary depending
on the specific facts present in each case; however, it is clear
that at least some level of physical inspection is required.
A key assessment issue is the criteria for valuing property.
Under the Kentucky Constitution, all non-exempt property must
be assessed at its fair cash value-"estimated at the price it
would bring at a fair voluntary sale." ' 43 Although section 172
was enacted in 1898 along with the rest of the present constitu-
tion, it was not followed, with regard to the fair cash value
clause, until almost 80 years later. Under a long line of cases
beginning with Eminence Distillery Co. v. Henry County Board
of Sup'rs.,44 the Kentucky court held that to force a fair cash
value assessment onto an individual taxpayer, while other tax-
payers' properties of the same class were valued at a lower rate,
violated sections 171, 172 and 174 of the state Constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
45
which requires equality in taxation. The Eminence court reme-
died this inequality by lowering the assessment of the person
assessed at fair cash value. 4 The court reasoned that to increase
the assessment of all other taxpayers would be inequitable and
would in reality be no relief at all. 47 In 1965, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals (now Supreme Court) decided Russman v. Luckett
48
and its sister cases. 49 In Russman, the Court went against the
• Id. at 687.
41 Id.
42 Id.
4' Ky. CONST. § 172. Such language is echoed throughout Title XI as well as in
§ 174 of the Constitution.
" 200 S.W. 347 (Ky. 1918).
41 Id. at 350-51.
Id. at 351.
47 Id.
8 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
41 McDevitt v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1965); Miller v. Layne, 391 S.W.2d
701 (Ky. 1965).
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long line of cases exemplified by Eminence and held that the
remedy was to raise all taxpayers' assessments up to fair cash
value.50 Thus, today all property must be valued at its fair cash
value.
Another aspect of the assessment problem is the uniformity
requirement. The Kentucky Constitution states that taxes "shall
be uniform upon all property of the same class."'" The Supreme
Court of Kentucky has interpreted this to mean "that the rate
of taxation must be the same for property of the same class." 52
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UNMINED MINERALS
TAX IN KENTUCKY
Subsurface minerals have been subject to taxation since Ken-
tucky became a state in 1792. Prior to 1950, coal in-place was
subject to an ad valorem property tax to the extent of its
contribution to the overall value of the surface property."' The
assessment value was determined through what was basically a
haggling contest between the taxpayer and the Tax Assessor (now
PVA).14 Generally, the taxpayer would file a return with the Tax
Assessor in which he would state a value for his interest in the
minerals." Next, if the Assessor disagreed with this assessment,
he would revalue the property.56 This was often followed by the
taxpayer appealing this revaluation.57 Usually, through negotia-
tions, the two sides would eventually agree on a compromise
valuation. 8 This was a workable system until the latter part of
the 19th century when many of the subsurface estates were
lo Russman, 391 S.W.2d at 699-700.
Ky. CONST. § 171.
52 Parrent v. Fannin, 616 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Ky. 1981).
Dutton & Bratton, The Feasibility and Revenue Effects of an Ad Valorem
Tax on Unmined Coal 1 (Oct. 31, 1983) (unpublished report to the Kentucky Legislative
Research Commission). In other words, if the surface estate was considered to be worth
$1,000 per acre and the minerals in situ on that property were worth an additional $200
per acre, the total value of that parcel of land was $1,200 per acre.
14 Stephens, Taxation of Coal Land in Kentucky (1983) (position paper presented
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severed from the surface estates through the sale, lease, or devise
of mineral rights.59 Once this occurred, separate assessment and
collection efforts had to be made for each category of ownership,
and since many of the mineral estate owners were unknown,
little tax was levied or collected from these potential taxpayers.
6
0
In the early 1950's, an attempt to create some uniformity of
assessments led to the development of a combination ad valorem
property tax and severance tax. 61 Under this approach, originat-
ing in Letcher County and later adopted by six other counties
with Department of Revenue support, the county was divided
into zones. 62 Each zone contained coal seams of reasonably
similar characteristics and each zone was given its own rate for
taxing unmined coal within that zone. 63 All unmined minerals
were taxed at the zone rate, while mined minerals were taxed at
ten times the zone rate. 6" For example, if a person owned 100
acres of land containing unmined coal in a zone with a rate of
$50.00 per acre and he mined 10 of those acres, he would be
taxed at $50.00 per acre on 90 acres and at $500.00 per acre on
10 acres.
65
A. 1976-78: A State Tax on Unmined Minerals
A significant change occurred in Kentucky's real property
tax program in 1976 when the Kentucky General Assembly passed
House Bill 677.66 This legislation established, for the first time
in Kentucky, a separate property tax for unmined minerals.
House Bill 677 levied a tax on unmined minerals at the rate of
$.315 per $100 of assessed value. 67 No local tax could be levied
on unmined coal under this bill unless such a levy was already
in effect. 68 The bill placed responsibility for the task of assess-
19 KENTUCKY FAIR TAX COALITION, TAXING UNMINED MINERALS IN KENTUCKY:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 7 (Oct. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Questions].
I d. at 5.





H.B. 677, Ky. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1976).
61 Dutton & Bratton, supra note 53, at 1.
" Id. at I n.2.
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ment in the hands of the state Revenue Cabinet.69 This allowed
for greater uniformity and consistency in the valuation process
because the Revenue Cabinet was more insulated from local
political pressures and had access to individuals who possessed
the requisite expertise to effectively assess unmined coal.
In 1977, the first year of the state controlled assessment
program, the Revenue Cabinet used documents such as severance
tax records and lease records in order to develop a list of
potential subsurface coal owners. 70 From these records a list of
8,300 names was generated. Forms were sent to these potential
owners asking for information about ownership, tracts of land,
and coal holdings.71 Of the 8,300 forms sent, 750 were returned
undelivered and 2,600 were completed and returned in a useable
manner. 72 By looking at information from other sources, the
Cabinet was able to assess 4,400 of the potential 8,300 coal
property owners in the first year.
7
1
The assessment efforts of the Revenue Cabinet were fruitful.
The assessed value of unmined coal increased by approximately
$100 million during the first year of state control. 74 In 1976, one
year prior to the start of the state effort, unmined coal was
assessed at $109 million; that figure almost doubled in 1977
increasing to $209 million.
75
One flaw in the 1977 assessment procedure was that the
entire acreage of unmined coal was assessed at full tonnage, as
it was assumed that none of the coal had been previously mined.
76
However, an appeals procedure was initiated in order to deal
with any possible overassessments. 77 Through the appeals pro-
cedure, if a taxpayer could show that some of the acres had
already been mined, the assessment could be adjusted accord-
" Id. at 1.
" Testimony of Virgil D. Barnard Ill, Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, before the




7, Id. at 5.
11 According to the 1982 Certification of Equalized Assessment from the Kentucky
Revenue Cabinet, the assessment of unmined coal for 1977 was actually closer to $213
million.
', Barnard, supra note 70, at 6.
7, Id. at 5-6.
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ingly. 78 One problem with this approach is that many coal owners
might not have known about or might have considered it unduly
burdensome to go through the appeals procedure. As a result,
the 1977 assessment data is probably not entirely accurate.
A more precise mapping effort was undertaken in the second
year of the state controlled assessment process. Representatives
of the Revenue Cabinet visited every county and met with coal
operators, land owners and other parties in order to expand the
list of 4400 coal land owners developed in 1977. New coal area
maps were developed by using this additional data in conjunction
with United States Geological Survey maps. 79 Coal areas were
designated in each county and a face value per acre was assigned
to each area. 0
For primary seams, a value per acre was placed on the
number of coal acres reported by the owner.8 If active mining
was occurring, that value was multiplied by 10 in order to
establish a current value for active coal. A percentage of primary
seam value was placed on secondary seams based on information
gathered from landowners and coal operators.12 The number of
coal land holdings that were assessed increased from 4,400 in
1977 to 6,000 in 1978.83 The total assessment in the final year
of state control was $278 million.8
B. 1978: Nominal Tax Rate and Local Assessment
Senate Bill 309 returned the responsibility of assessing un-
mined coal to the local PVA and reduced the tax rate from
$.315 per $100 of value to $.001 per $100 of value.85 Since the
passage of this bill, local PVAs have had the responsibility for
updating coal area maps that were developed during the previous
state-controlled effect.8 6 The lowering of the rate of tax on
7: See id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
'o Id. at 7-8.
SI Id. at 8.
I d.
3 Barnard, supra note 70, at 9.
Id.
S.B. 309, Ky. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1978).
See Dutton, supra note 53, at 2.
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unmined coal has reduced the incentive of the PVA to actively
continue updating assessments. Although unmined coal assess-
ments have increased from $279 million in 1978 to $318 million
in 1982, some counties which showed large assessments in 1978
showed a $-0- assessment in 1982.7 Even with the slightly larger
tax base, revenues from the unmined minerals tax declined from
$673,000 in 1977 to about $3,000 in 1982.88
C. 1982 and 1984: Legislative Attempts to Tax Unmined
Minerals
There have been two attempts to pass an unmined minerals
tax in the last four years. The first attempt was House Bill 549
(HB 549) which was introduced during the 1982 session of the
General Assembly. This bill proposed several changes to Title
XI of the KRS. These changes would have created an ad valorem
tax on all unmined minerals at the same real property rate as
applies to other real property. House Bill 549 proposed to re-
define real property to include unmined minerals and to elimi-
nate KRS section 132.020(5), thus subjecting unmined minerals
to the general real property tax rate. 9 This bill would have also
avoided any possible problems resulting from the 4% inflation-
ary limit placed on the increase to the aggregate assessed value
of all property already on the tax rolls under KRS section
132.020(7). This would have been accomplished by amending
that section to exclude from the 4% cap "the increase caused
by the assessment of unmined minerals .. .prior to January 1,
1987." 9 Furthermore, the unmined minerals were to be treated
as new property and so would not be subject to the 4% limita-
tion. 91
Under HB 549, unmined minerals would have been divided
into two types: non-extractable and extractable. " 'Non-extract-
11 Henderson County went from over $21 million to $-0- and Breathitt County
went from over $14 million to $-0- between 1978 and 1982. Id. at 6.
u Id. at 3.
89 H.B. 549, Ky. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 1(3) (1982). [Although H.B. 549
was originally introduced Feb. 18, 1982 by Representatives Little and Donnermeyer, the
cites herein refer to the March 15, 1982 version substituted by The House Committee
on Appropriations and Revenue. Ed.]
Id. § 2(7).
I d. § 1(8)(i).
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able unmined mineral interest' means any fee simple interest in
unmined minerals of less than one hundred (100) contiguous
acres owned by a taxpayer not engaged in the business of ex-
tracting or leasing for extraction unmined minerals. ' 92 Extract-
able unmined minerals would be all other interests in unmined
minerals. 93 Non-extractable unmined minerals would be subject
to tax at the rate of $.001 per $100 value, while extractable
unmined minerals would be taxed at $.315 per $100 value.9
Thus, tracts of less than 100 acres owned in fee simple by
taxpayers not in the "coal business" were effectively excluded
from taxation through application of the nominal tax rate.
Other "effective exclusions" from the tax resulted from
deeming the value of unmined minerals to be $-0- in certain
instances where: (1) the owner of the surface estate is also the
owner of the mineral estate; the surface is used for farming,
residential, commercial, or other purposes inconsistent with the
extraction of the minerals; and the owner has not leased a
portion of his mineral estate; (2) the land is depleted or barren;
(3) the minerals cannot be extracted due to geological, economic,
or legal reasons. 95 These exclusions serve to protect surface own-
ers who are making their living or residing on the land and have
no intention or desire to mine the minerals below the surface.
They also prevent owners from being taxed on minerals that are
not present or that cannot be extracted.
Another change that HB 549 would have brought about was
the return of the responsibility for assessing unmined minerals
from the local PVA to the Revenue Cabinet.9 However, the
PVA would still assess all of the tangible property such as
preparation plants and tipples.9 Such a change would help to
provide a more uniform assessment of unmined minerals
throughout the state and yet leave to the local PVA assessment
of tangible property which could often be best accomplished by
inspection.
.2 Id. § 1(17).
93 Id.
- Id. § 2(5).
91 H.B. 549, Ky. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 7(1) (1982).
- Id. § 6(2).
- Id. § 6(5).
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Even with its "exclusions," HB 549 was unsuccessful, failing
to pass the House after much debate and amendment in com-
mittee and on the House floor. 9 However, the proponents of
an unmined minerals tax did not give up. On the first day of
the 1984 General Assembly, House Bill 92 (HB 92), a pre-filed
bill, was introduced in the House. Like its predecessor HB
549, HB 92 was an attempt to tax unmined minerals at the same
rate as other real property by redefining real property to include
unmined minerals. 99
However, there were some differences between HB 92 and
HB 549. HB 92 tended to be broader in its reach and more
flexible than HB 549. For example, in HB 549, the guidelines
placed on the Revenue Cabinet for assessing the value of the
unmined minerals were fairly explicit.Y00 On the other hand, in
HB 92, the Department of Revenue is required to assess the
minerals "according to valuation methods that fairly establish the
actual value of mineral properties."''
There are two other important differences between HB 92
and HB 549. The first of these is the classification of mineral
interests. Under HB 549, mineral interests were merely classified
as either extractable or non-extractable.' 0 " Under HB 92, mineral
interests are divided into four classes. First, " 'active mining
property' means a mineral seam on a parcel involved in a mining
operation .... The active mining portion of each seam on a
parcel is ... (750) acres."'0 3 Second, " 'active reserves' means
the residual part of the mineral seam or seams which are actively
being mined in excess of the active mining acreage or the number
of acres corresponding to . . . (25) years of production, which-
ever is less."' Third, " 'inactive reserve' means those seams of
minerals which are mineable and merchantable but are not being
produced in an active mining operation or are not assignable to
an active reserve property."'' 5 Finally, " 'barren or mined out'
15 LEG. REC. 61, 138 (Apr. 20, 1982).
" H.B. 92, Ky. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 1(3) (1984).
" See H.B. 549, Ky. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 6(2) (1982).
101 H.B. 92, § 6(2).
02 H.B. 549, § 1(17).
H.B. 92, § 1(19).
Id. § 1(20).
Id. § 1(21).
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property means those seams of minerals which have been de-
pleted by prior mining operations or the existence of one (1) or
more mineral seams have not been established. '" 106 In valuing
mineral properties, the Revenue Cabinet is to take into consid-
eration the above classifications.l°7
The second important difference between the bills is that HB
92 does not provide any of the "exclusions" from the unmined
minerals tax provided in HB 549. Under HB 92, property such
as farms and property of less than 100 acres is subject to tax at
a rate of $.315 per $100 of value. However, such mineral prop-
erty would likely be given little value as "inactive reserve prop-
erty."
08
HB 92 met with even less success in the legislature than its
predecessor. After it was introduced, HB 92 was sent to the
Appropriations and Revenue Committee, from which it was not
reported out. ,09
Legislative attempts to tax unmined coal at the same rates
as other real property have not been successful. However, pro-
ponents of such taxation have been successful in obtaining a
decision by the Franklin Circuit Court that the present 1/10 cent
tax rate on unmined coal constitutes an unconstitutional exemp-
tion of unmined coal from taxation."10
111. LEGALITY OF THE CURRENT TAx REGME
FOR UNMINED COAL
In three recent suits, the present regime of taxation of un-
mined coal was challenged."' These cases raise three basic issues
regarding current taxation of unmined coal: (1) whether the
present law is being properly administered, (2) whether the 1/10
-- Id. § 1(22).
107 Id. § 6(2).
'- West Virginia has the same classifications of mineral properties in their tax
statute as was proposed in H.B. 92. Inactive reserve properties are generally valued at
approximately $300 per acre in West Virginia.
16 LEG. REc. 64, 67 (1984).
, Moore v. Gillis, No. 84-C[-0867, slip op. (Ky. Franklin Cir. Ct. July 10, 1985).
Nowak v. Foster, No. C84-0057 P(J) (W.D. Ky. filed Feb. 17, 1984); Yount v.
Gillis, No. 84-CI-0815, slip op. (Franklin Cir. Ct., July 10, 1985); Moore v. Gillis, No.
84-CI-0867, slip op. (Franklin Cir. Ct., July 10, 1985). Yount and Moore were consolidated
by the Supreme Court.
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cent tax rate on unmined coal violates constitutional require-
ments of uniformity, and (3) whether the 1/10 cent tax rate on
unmined coal constitutes a de facto exemption from property
tax in violation of the Kentucky Constitution.
Nowak v. Foster raised the issue of whether the PVAs were
improperly administering the statute by failing to assess unmined
coal within their counties." 2 Since the tax would produce less
revenue than it costs to assess the coal, it is not surprising that
the PVAs failed to assess the coal within their county. This issue
will probably never be resolved if the 1/10 cent tax rate on coal
is held unconstitutional, since the PVAs or anyone else charged
with assessing unmined coal would undoubtedly do so if un-
mined coal were taxed at rates which produced substantial rev-
enues.
The uniformity argument is based upon the fact that un-
mined coal is taxed differently under the current statutes than is
other real property, including oil and gas." 3 In Yount v. Gillis," 
4
the gravamen of the complaint was that the provision in KRS
section 132.020(5) which sets the tax rate on unmined coal at
1/10 cent per $100 of value violated section 171 of the Kentucky
Constitution. ' Section 171 provides that taxation shall be uni-
form upon property of the same class subject to taxation within
the territorial limits of the authority levying the taxes." 6 In
Moore, the plaintiffs argued that KRS section 132.020(5) violated
the equal protection provisions in the Kentucky Constitution."
7
They argued that no rational basis exists for the legislative
classification of unmined coal at a rate of taxation of 1/10 cent
while oil and gas are taxed at the same rate as other real
property."'
It appears that legislative classification of unmined coal sep-
arate from other real property, including oil and gas, is consti-
tutional. To be constitutional, the legislative tax classification
,"2 No. C84-0057 P(J) at 2; see also Note, Taxation of Unmined Minerals: Is It
Inevitable, or Is it Unconstitutional, I J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 97 (1985).
" See Nowak, No. C84-0057 P(J) at 2.
No. 84-CI-0815, slip op. (Franklin Cir. Ct. July 10, 1984).
Id. at 2.
16 KY. CONST. § 171.
Moore, No. 84-CI-0867 at 3; Ky. CONST. § 1.
Moore, No. 84-CI-0867 at 3.
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must have a reasonable relation to some permitted end of gov-
ernment-the classification must not be arbitrary and unreason-
able.119 Unmined coal is unlike other real property in that unmined
coal has basically only a future potential beneficial use. Realty,
however, can be rented or used by the owner to obtain present
enjoyment. Unmined coal is also different from oil and gas in
that unmined coal is stationary, while oil and gas deposits can
flow from beneath one property and be depleted by wells on
neighboring properties. Because oil and gas is usually found in
pools or pockets, there is little likelihood of property being
assessed for oil and gas deposits based upon estimates of oil
deposits on nearby properties. Oil and gas deposit assessments
are likely to be based upon the existence of one or more oper-
ating wells on the property. Thus, there appear to be sufficient
differences between unmined coal and other real property to
constitutionally justify a separate classification for tax purposes.
In Moore, the complainants relied on sections 3 and 174 of
the Kentucky Constitution to support their claim that KRS sec-
tion 132.020(5) provides an unconstitutional de facto exemption
of unmined coal from state property tax. 120 They argued that
"the levy upon unmined coal is so low, especially in relation to
the costs of its administration and collection, that it cannot be
fairly called a tax."'' For example, unmined coal with a value
of $100,000 has a tax of $1 levied on it under KRS section
132.020(5) and the complainants argue, "such a low rate strips
a levy of its revenue generating characteristics . . . rendering it
no longer a tax."'
122
Another argument was that such a low rate of tax "makes
it financially imprudent for the Revenue Cabinet or Kentucky's
PVAs to assess or collect the levy because the cost of adminis-
tration exceeds the yield."' 23 Such expenses would be at least
$400,000 per year, which is about 153 times greater than the
See, e.g., Yount, No. 84-CI-0815 at 5 (partial summary judgment holding KRS
§ 132.020(5) not in violation of Ky. CoNsT. § 171).
Moore, No. 84-0867 at 2, 3.
Brief for Plaintiff at 2, Moore v. Gillis, No. 84-CI-0867 (Franklin Cir. Ct.,
July 10, 1985).
"I Id. at 10.
123 Id.
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revenue generated from the tax. Sections 3 and 174 of the
Kentucky Constitution prohibit exemption of property from state
tax (unless exempted under section 170 of the Kentucky Consti-
tution) and since KRS section 132.020(5) arguably creates a de
facto exemption from state tax, it was contended that it was
unconstitutional. 
24
On July 24, 1985, final judgment was rendered in favor of
plaintiffs. The court held KRS section 132.020(5) unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that it did not constitute a tax and thus
violated sections 3 and 174 of the Kentucky Constitution.1
25
Cabinet Secretary Gillis is reported to be appealing this decision
to the Court of Appeals.
26
The Moore decision raises the question of whether the leg-
islature may do indirectly what it cannot do directly (exempt
unmined coal from tax) and, if not, when is a tax so low as not
to constitute a tax in substance? For example, would a property
tax rate of 2 cents per $100 of value be so low as not to constitute
a tax? Is the test whether the tax produces revenue in excess of
the costs of administration or must such excess net revenues
generated be "meaningful" in amount or in relation to the value
of the property being taxed?
Another question raised by the Moore decision is whether
application of the 1/10 cent rate per $100 of value to other
property, such as pensions, bank deposits and farm imple-
ments, 27 is unconstitutional. The 1/10 cent rate could be uncon-
stitutional when applied to unmined coal, but constitutional
when applied to some other interest such as vested pension
benefits which might not be "property" for tax purposes.
28
Vested pension benefits are "property" for purposes of divorce,
but they might not be "property" for tax purposes since, in
general, they cannot be sold, exchanged, cashed-in, assigned or
used as security for a loan before maturity, and their disposition
'2 Moore, No. 84-CI-0867 at I I (holding the 1/10 cent levy was not a tax, therefore
violating KY. CONST. §§ 3, 174).
125 Id.
,16 Ky. Coal J., Aug. 1985, at 3.
327 See generally KRS § 132.020 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (setting forth ad valorem taxes
assessed by the state).
- Cf. Commonwealth v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 116 S.W. 766
(Ky. 1909) (holding a trademark not "property" for purposes of the Ky. CONST. § 174).
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on death of the owner is greatly limited by the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984.129 Although unmined coal, like pension plans, ar-
guably produces no current benefit to the owner, unmined coal
can be sold, exchanged or used as security for a loan, and can
be transferred at death like other real property. 30
IV. SPECULATIVE VALUATION OF UNMINED COAL
While assessments of realty, oil, and gas values involve some
subjective determinations on the part of the PVA, the valuation
of unmined minerals is much more speculative in nature. This
is due basically to two factors: (1) there is a scarcity of objective
data on the exact location, quantity and quality of unmined
minerals under any particular tract of land and (2) the lack of
comparable sales, necessitating estimates of net profits to be
realized on the mining of such coal at some uncertain future
time. Perhaps this speculative nature can best be seen by com-
paring the assessment of unmined coal with the assessment of
farm land.
With farm land, as with most real property, the PVA can
physically inspect the asset directly. The PVA is required to
physically inspect all real property once every two years. 3 ' He
can also obtain information from the owner who has first hand
knowledge of the asset. The PVA can also consider sales of
similar property and prior sales of the same property when trying
to assess the value of the farm land. Even when information is
needed which cannot be obtained through observation, the meth-
ods used to obtain such information are relatively inexpensive
and place no real burden on the assessor or the landowner.
For example, it may be necessary to ascertain the type and
condition of the soil or the slope of the land in order to deter-
mine which crop is most suited to be grown on a particular piece
of farm land. In Dolan v. Land,3 2 the PVA was able to use
" Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
130 Note, Taxation of Unmined Minerals: Is It Inevitable, or Is It Unconstitutional?.,
1 J. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 97, 116-20 (1985) (a detailed discussion of the "property" issue
as it relates to taxation of unmined coal in Kentucky).
131 KRS § 132.690 (1982).
"3 667 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Ky. 1984) (Gant, J. dissenting).
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books and survey maps which contained a complete analysis of
the farm's slope and soil type. "From the College of Agriculture
at the University of Kentucky, Dolan obtained all pertinent data
relating to crops grown in Fayette County and the type of soil
and slope best suited for each. These records included cost of
planting and return, or yield on each crop."' 33 Thus, in Dolan,
all the necessary information was already compiled by prior
research and surveys. However, even if the PVA had to acquire
all this information for the first time, such information could
be acquired at relatively low cost.
It is much more difficult, if not impossible, to get an accurate
assessment of the actual value of unmined coal without extensive
and expensive testing and sampling. "[D]espite the existence of
governmental and industrial zone maps and surveys, estimates
of the exact location of the underground coal as well as its
quantity and quality are largely guesswork."' l The Kentucky
Geologic survey estimates 5 billion tons of "measured reserves"
(within 1/4 mile of measured coal reserves), 21 billion tons of
"indicated reserves" (within 3/4 mile of measured coal) and 38
billion tons of estimated coal (within 3 miles of measured coal).' 35
Although it may be statistically accurate to estimate coal
reserves for the entire state using such methods, 36 there is much
less certainty that the estimated coal reserves in any particular
location are accurate. Even if the location of the coal can be
determined, valuation is not easy. The characteristics and value
of an acre of coal may vary significantly from a different acre
of coal located within close proximity,' 37 because the value of a
coal deposit is dependent to a great extent on the thickness of
the coal seam and coal seam thickness can vary greatly within
short distances.
There is a whole panoply of factors which may affect the
actual value of the coal. Among these factors are: is there
133 Id.
Whiteside & Buechel, Kentucky Taxation, 65 Ky. L.J. 425, 430 (1976-77).
,3 Ky. Coal J., Aug. 1985, at 3.
,36 Over estimates of actual coal in one area may be offset by under estimates in
another area.
,17 Stephens, Taxation of Coal Land in Kentucky 2 (1983) (position paper presented
to the Kentucky Unmined Mineral Tax Advisory Commission).
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enough coal in the tract to justify extraction; what is the BTU
content of the coal; what is the seam thickness; what impurities
are present in the coal; how accessible is the coal for mining;
what will reclamation costs be; can necessary surface rights be
acquired; what will transportation costs be; is there available
labor; and is there a market for the coal?'3 8 This is not an
exhaustive list of factors, but it is sufficient to give some idea
of the speculative nature of. assessing the value of unmined
minerals.
In both HB 92 and HB 549 attempts were made to deal with
these problems. Under HB 92, the Revenue Cabinet was to
determine the fair cash value of all unmined minerals "according
to valuation methods that fairly establish the actual value of
mineral properties.'" 3 9 Under HB 549, the Revenue Cabinet was
to determine the fair cash value of the unmined minerals "in the
same manner and according to the same standards" as if the PVA
had valued the property.14 Furthermore, emphasis would be given
to estimates of the Kentucky Geological Survey and the Institute
for Mining and Mineral Research in determining the quantity and
quality of the minerals.'4
Other factors to be used in determining the value of the
unmined minerals include taxpayers' maps and records, sales of
similar interests, current market prices for the extracted minerals,
availability of transportation and preparation facilities, BTU,
sulphur and ash content, and the degree to which the minerals
are under production or could be put into immediate produc-
tion. 42 Even with the available data and the best intentions,
assessment of unmined coal on a particular tract of land, without
core drilling or gamma ray density tests, would not approach
the accuracy of assessment of surface land in most cases.
If the location, quantity and quality of farm land in a
particular tract were ascertained, the value of the farm land
could be estimated by comparison with recent sales of similar
farm land and prior sales of the same farm land. Although all
138 Id.
"I H.B. 92, Ky. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 6(2) (1984).
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farm land is unique, there is a likelihood of greater similarity
between two pieces of farm land then there is between two tracts
of unmined coal. Furthermore, there is a greater likelihood of
finding comparable or prior sales of farm land than comparable
or prior sales of unmined coal. Even if such comparable sales
of farm land did not exist, the present income potential of the
farm land could be capitalized to estimate fair cash value. Un-
mined coal, other than coal being actively mined, has present
value only if it can be sold now or profitably exploited in the
future.
With a lack of comparable sales of unmined coal, it becomes
necessary to estimate future profits from exploitation of the
unmined coal and discount those future profits down to present
value. Estimating profits on the exploitation of the coal at some
uncertain future date is obviously more speculative than esti-
mating current rental value or income generating potential of
farm land. Present value of unmined coal deposits based upon
future profitability requires estimates of several factors, includ-
ing, but not limited to: future prices for coal; 143 future costs of
coal production; 144 time when the coal will be extracted; 45 and
a fair discount rate.
The problem of valuing unmined minerals is of particular
importance since the Kentucky Constitution requires that prop-
erty be valued at its fair cash value. 14 Due to its nature, the
assessment of the fair cash value of unmined coal is a much
more difficult and expensive process than the assessment of other
types of property. There are several variables which will affect
the value of the unmined coal. Some of these variables, such as
transportation costs, cannot actually be determined until some
indefinite future date. Opponents of an unmined minerals tax
have argued that such factors make it impossible for the fair
cash value of unmined coal to be determined, and therefore a
tax on unmined coal would be unconstitutional.
"3 Prices will depend in part on availability of energy substitutes, coal supply and
demand. See P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS (1 th ed. 1980).
" E.g., costs of mining, transportation, reclamation.
14 Obviously, $500,000 in profits 50 years from now is worth less than $500,000
in profits 10 years from now. If Kentucky's coal reserves will last 200 years, what is the
present value of coal that will be mined 100 years from now?
I" Ky. CONST. § 172.
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The HB 92 solution to these valuation problems is to create
four classes of unmined coal.147 Only active mining property and
active reserves would be valued at or near the going price for
unmined minerals. Obviously, the timing element of valuation
is easiest for active mining property-it is possible to estimate
at current rates of production the time period necessary to mine
out the coal deposit. Since production is currently taking place,
the need to make estimates of future coal prices and costs at
some uncertain future date is minimized.
Inactive reserves would probably be valued on a per acre
basis under HB 92.148 This lower value would often, but not
always, be consistent with the greater discount to present value
for coal that is not mineable under present economic circum-
stances. If there is error in the estimation of fair cash value, the
error should be on the side of undervaluation in order to avoid
irreparable harm to individual taxpayers.
The consequence of the HB 92 four tier valuation system
would be much like an increase in the severance tax, with the
burden of the tax falling primarily on current and near future
production. Both the long-term investor, who leaves his reserves
inactive, and the coal owner, who cannot now economically
mine his reserves, would have their coal valued in the more
favorable inactive reserve category.
V. EFFECTS OF THE BROAD FORM DEED ACT ON UNMINED
MINERALS TAX
In February, 1984, the General Assembly passed the Broad
Form Deed Act (the Act). 149 This act created four new sections
in chapter 381 of the KRS. Under the Act, all past, present and
future instruments which sever a mineral estate from a surface
estate, and which fail to specifically state how the mineral is to
be extracted, shall be held, in the absence of contrary evidence,
to mean "that the intention of the parties to the instrument was
that the coal be extracted only by the method or methods of
commercial coal extraction commonly known to be in use in
47 See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
,41 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
,,9 1984 Ky. ACTS ch. 28.
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Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument was
executed."150 In most cases, this effectively prevents the operator
or the mineral owner from extracting the coal through surface
mining techniques such as strip mining and open pit mining,
unless the surface owner agrees to such methods, since most of
the mineral deeds were signed before the advent of such surface
mining techniques."t ' Prior to the Act, the general rule in Ken-
tucky had been that the surface estate was subservient to the
mineral estate, and that the coal operator or mineral owner
could use any method he chose to extract the coal.1
2
The Act has been the subject of much argument in the coal
industry regarding its constitutionality. Among the arguments
against the Act's constitutionality are those presented by John
S. Palmore, former Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme
Court, in his brief for the intervenors in the U.S. District Court
case of Akers v. Baldwin.'53 Palmore argued: (1) that the.Act
unconstitutionally infringes upon the exclusive prerogative of the
judicial branch to construe deeds and instruments already in
effect; (2) the act constitutes a violation of Section 14 of the
Kentucky Constitution and Article 1, section 10 of the Federal
Constitution which prohibit laws which impair the obligation of
contracts; (3) the Act deprives the mineral owner of his property
without due process of law; and (4) the Act constitutes a taking
of the mineral owner's property without just compensation.'
5 4
One Circuit Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
Act. "'55 In reaching this result, Judge Manis stated that "[aln
unconstitutional taking would occur where the rights that were
bargained for are thereafter taken away. Here, that is simply
not the case. The statutes protect the rights actually bargained
for."' 5 6 The U.S. District Court has certified to the Kentucky
KRS § 381.935 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
" But see Strip Mining New?, Ky. Coal J., May 1985, at 3 (where it is claimed
that strip mining (horse drawn plows) began in 1870 in Kentucky and that a steam
shovel was first used in Kansas in 1877).
"I See Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968). But cf.
Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1976).
" Brief for intervenors, Akers v. Baldwin, No. 84-88 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
Id. at 21-43; see also The Coal Operators, Ky. Coal J., May 1985, at 13.
" Baker v. Wooten, No. 83-CI-429, slip op. (Ky. Perry Co. Cir. Ct. Apr. 3,
1985).
,36 Id. at 8.
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Supreme Court the issue of whether the Act violates the Ken-
tucky Constitution. 5 7 The issue will be decided within the next
few weeks.
If the Broad Form Deed Act is found to be constitutional,
then another issue is raised: can a surface owner enjoin a coal
operator or mineral estate owner from mining the land when the
property rights of each side are in dispute, or is the surface
owner merely entitled to damages? Whether the remedy is dam-
ages or injunction could dramatically affect the valuation of
unmined coal. At present, it would appear that the surface owner
can enjoin the operators from extracting coal through surface
mining. The factors which influenced the Court in Akers v.
Baldwin to issue a preliminary injunction pending determination
of the constitutionality of the Act would arguably favor giving
the surface owner a right to enjoin strip mining of his land if
the Act is constitutional.
5 8
Assuming the Act is constitutional, and that the surface
owner would be entitled to injunctive relief, the question be-
comes what effect would this Act have on an ad valorem un-
mined minerals tax? Under the Act, it would be possible to have
a situation where no one party would have the right to strip
mine the minerals.ms9 For example, the owner of a mineral estate
contracts with an operator to mine his coal. The operator wants
to strip mine the coal, but strip mining was not a common
method used to extract coal when the deed severing the mineral
estate from the surface estate was executed, and the present
surface owner refuses to agree to extraction by strip mining. The
coal cannot be legally extracted by strip mining.16°
The coal reserves in the above example could be valued for
tax purposes at close to zero value,' 16 or at market value, dis-
" Akers v. Baldwin, No. 85-SC-392CL (Ky. May 23, 1985) (order granting certi-
fication and granting transfer).
"I Akers v. Baldwin, No. 84-88, slip op. (E.D. Ky. Feb. 28, 1985) (preliminary
injunction filed concurrently with opinion); see also Short, A Summary of The Order,
Ky. Coal J., Apr. 1985, at 5.
",2 Cf. The Legal Right to Mine Interfaces With a Tax on Unmined Coal, Ky. Coal
J., Apr. 1985, at 4.
- The owner of the mineral estate would have the right to deep mine the coal but
deep mining may be impossible or economically impracticable due to the higher costs of
deep mining.
I " See supra note 159.
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regarding the need for both the surface owner and the mineral
estate owner to agree to exploitation of the coal by strip min-
ing. 162 Obviously, the mineral estate by itself is nearly worthless
if strip mining is the only economical method of extracting the
coal. Similarly, the interest of the surface owner in the mineral
estate, by itself, even if it could be characterized as a property
interest, is nearly worthless. However, since they could realize
the full value of the mineral interest by acting in concert, it is
reasonable that they should share the property tax burden
equally. 63 The mineral owner would be liable for property tax
on one-half the full value of the unmined minerals without
regard to the surface owner's power to prevent strip mining.
The surface owner would not be liable for any property tax on
the unmined minerals, but the value of his surface estate would
be increased by an amount equal to one-half the full value of
the unmined minerals to reflect the additional value of the
surface estate attributable to the fact that the power to control
strip mining is one of the valuable attributes of the surface
estate. No special legislation would be needed to accomplish this
result since these are arguably fair estimates of the fair cash
value of the mineral estate and the surface estate.
VI. IMPACT OF AN UNMINED MINERALS TAX ON FARMS
If an unmined minerals tax becomes law in Kentucky, a
question arises as to whether unmined minerals in all situations
should be subject to such a tax. Although there is no exemption
under HB 92 for minerals beneath a factory or residence owned
162 Compare Ky. CONST. § 172 requiring that all. property be valued at "fair cash
value." Fair cash value is the price that the property would bring at a voluntary sale.
KRS § 132.190(3) (1984); Kenmont Coal Co. v. Perry County Bd. of Supervisors, 91
S.W.2d 47, 48 (Ky. 1936); Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Knott County, 59 S.W.2d
1002, 1003 (Ky. 1933). Arguably, fair cash value of such a mineral estate is close to
zero and thus should be subject only to minimal tax. The only buyer of either the
mineral estate interest or the surface estate consent interest is one who already owns one
of those interests or one who is buying both simultaneously. In either event, the buyer
is under "compulsion" to buy to prevent the other interest from being worthless. Such
compulsion is arguably inconsistent with the concept of a voluntary sale.
63 There are several situations under Federal estate tax law where a pro rata share
of the property is included in the decedent's estate. E.g., I.R.C. § 2040 (1979 & Supp.
1985) (certain joint tenancies), I.R.C. § 2041 (1979) (jointly held general power of
appointment).
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by the owner of the factory or residence, presumably such min-
erals would add minimal value to the property, because they
would be economically unmineable. The problem is different for
farms and other tracts of land with large acreage, where the
value of the underlying minerals might be substantial and might
even exceed the value of the surface estate.
Should a farmer have to pay taxes on coal located beneath
his farm when he owns both the surface and mineral estates in
fee, but he makes his living by farming the land, and has no
intention of ever extracting the coal or of allowing anyone else
to extract the coal? It is unclear how such circumstances would
be treated under HB 92. It may be helpful to consider how such
a situation would be treated under HB 549 and under West
Virginia's law taxing unmined minerals.
House Bill 549 contained several "exemptions" that would
have allowed certain properties to be taxed at the old rate of
1/10 cent per $100 of value, or that would have caused the minerals
to have a deemed fair cash value of zero.' 64 Among these was
section 7(l)(a), which deemed unmined minerals to have a value
of zero if: (1) the taxpayer held a fee simple interest in both the
surface and mineral estates; (2) the surface was used for agri-
cultural or horticultural purposes; (3) the taxpayer had not leased
out the right to extract the minerals within five years; (4) there
was no portion of the mineral estate presently under lease; (5)
the owner had not extracted any minerals; and (6) the owner
was not in the business of extracting or leasing for extraction
unmined minerals. 165 Assuming no minerals had been extracted
or leased out for extraction, the unmined minerals would be
deemed to have a fair cash value of zero if the "agricultural or
horticultural" requirements under KRS section 132.010 were
met. ,66
Agricultural land is a tract of land "of at least ten contiguous
acres in area used for the production of livestock, livestock
products, poultry, poultry products and/or the growing of to-
bacco and/or other crops including timber, or where devoted to
I" See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
,61 H.B. 549, Ky. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 7(l)(a) (1982).
'" KRS § 132.010 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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and meeting the requirements and qualifications for payments
pursuant to agriculture programs under an agreement with the
state or federal government." ' 67 There is also a requirement that
a certain average annual gross income be produced according to
a scale based on the acreage in the farm.1
Horticultural land is "any tract of land .. .of at least five
contiguous acres in area commercially used for the cultivation
of a garden, orchard, or the raising of fruits or nuts, vegetables,
flowers or ornamental plants.' ' 69 Horticultural land is also sub-
ject to an average annual gross income requirement.' 70 These
sections of KRS are the legislative codification of section 172A
of the Kentucky Constitution which states that "the general
assembly shall provide by general law for the assessment for ad
valorem tax purposes of agricultural and horticultural land ac-
cording to the land's value for agricultural or horticultural use."'
7
In most respects, the West Virginia unmined minerals tax'
72
is more like HB 92 than HB 549. Under West Virginia law and
HB 92, there are no specified exemptions from the unmined
minerals tax. Yet, in West Virginia, the Revenue Cabinet does
not generally tax minerals beneath farm land. 73 As a result, if
a farm meets the regulatory criteria and the taxpayer owns a fee
estate in both the surface and mineral estates, then generally the
minerals are deemed to have no value for tax purposes. '74 How-
ever, if the taxpayer makes use of the minerals, leases the right
to extract any portion of the minerals, or if 500 of the income
from the property is derived from any natural resource, then the
owner is taxed on the value of the minerals.' 7 The amount of
this tax on the farmer (solely due to the existence of the minerals)
would be between $7.50 and $20.00 per acre because the property
would be classified as "inactive reserves. '
I- KRS § 132.010(9) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
I68 d.
KRS § 132.010(10) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
170 Id.
KY. CONST. § 172A.
"' W. Va. Leg. Reg. 11-IA, Series IA, § 11.04 (1984).
,7 W. Va. Leg. Reg. II-IA, Series IA, § 10.05(f)(3), at 10.29 (1985).
17 Id.
175 Id.
76 According to John Melton, Director of the Ad Valorem Tax Division in West
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Since farm land was de facto exempted from the unmined
minerals tax under HB 549 and under West Virginia law, it would
not be surprising if farm land was de facto exempted from an
unmined minerals tax imposed by HB 92. The de facto exemption
of farm land from the unmined minerals tax would be constitu-
tional, since it would be based upon KRS 132.010(9) and (10),
and section 172A of the Kentucky Constitution, which allow farm
land to be valued at its agricultural or horticultural value. The
defacto exemption would apply since the underlying minerals would
add nothing to the agricultural or horticultural value of the farm
land.
Under HB 92, minerals underlying property which did not
qualify as agricultural or horticultural would be classified and
taxed as active mining property, active reserves or inactive re-
serves. 77 Minerals in the inactive reserve classification would
probably, as in West Virginia, be valued at between $200 and
$800 per acre, depending upon the quantity, quality and other
characteristics of the mineral reserve.
The problem with exempting agricultural and horticultural
land from the tax on unmined minerals is that such exemption
would presumably be used by every owner of a valuable mineral
estate who also owns the surface estate to escape taxation of his
mineral estate. It is likely that Eastern Kentucky could develop
some of the steepest timber and cattle farms in the United States,
perhaps an unforeseen salutary economic development encour-
aged by taxation of unmined minerals.
If farm land is not exempted from the unmined minerals
tax, the consequences could be disastrous for the farm industry.
Even a minimum additional property tax of $10 per acre could
force some farmers out of farming in today's economy. Many
farmers might be forced to obtain the "highest and best use"
for their property by selling, leasing or mining the coal under
their farm.
Virginia, inactive reserve values range from $300 to $800 per acre. J. Melton, Presen-
tation to the Kentucky Unmined Minerals Tax Advisory Commission at 31 (1984).
Assuming this value was taxed at a rate of 2.5%, the amount of tax would range from
$7.50 to $20.00 per acre.
117 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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Similar problems arise when the farmer is merely the surface
owner whose consent is required to strip mine the underlying
coal deposits owned by another person. Presumably, the consent
power of the farmer would not increase the agricultural or
horticultural value of his farm land and thus the surface owner/
farmer would be de facto exempt from the tax on unmined
minerals." 8 The problem caused by the de facto exemption
of the surface owner/farmer from sharing the burden of the tax
on the unmined minerals with the owner of the mineral estate
is that the farmer's incentive to consent to strip mining would
be seriously impaired. The surface owner/farmer could sit back
and wait while the mineral estate owner paid property tax on
minerals which he could not strip mine until eventually the owner
of the mineral estate might be induced to sell his mineral estate
for "peanuts." Under such circumstances, it is evident that the
value of the mineral estate is practically nil and should be subject
to no tax or a very low tax. 179
VII. IMPACT OF TAX ON OTHER UNMINED MINERALS
Coal is by far Kentucky's most important mineral re-
source. 80 Furthermore, coal underlies about 44o of the entire
"I But see supra notes, 161-63 and accompanying text.
SId.
"s Ky. DEPT. OF ECON. DEV., ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN KENTUCKY at
vi (1984) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES]. This table illustrates
the value of coal relative to other mineral resources.
1982 MINERAL PRODUCTION IN KENTUCKY
Production Value
Bituminous Coal2  147,930,000 4,502,989,200
Petroleuml(BBLS) 7,348,800 236,776,000
Natural Gas'(mcf) 51,924,000 78,830,000
Clays4(tons) 591,000 3,140,000
Crushed Stone4(tons) 29,650,000 105,600,000
Sand & Gravel1 4,300,000 8,960,000
Gem Stones4
Combined Value of Cement
(tons), Clays (Ball Clay), Lime, Industrial
Sand & Gravel & Zinc
1,000
83,085,000
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state.' Although minerals other than coal are presently subject
to real property ad valorem tax in Kentucky,' 82 there is apparently
no state-wide extensive mapping and assessment effort being made
to effectively tax reserves of unmined minerals. It is likely that
such an effort to obtain uniformity of enforcement of the taxa-
tion of all unmined minerals would be cost prohibitive. 83 For
many of these minerals, the only statewide estimates currently
available are "abundant."' 4Valuation of particular deposits, once
located, would be difficult and expensive.
Presumably, an unmined minerals tax on coal would have
little impact on the taxation of other unmined minerals.'85 Tax-
ation of other unmined minerals is likely to continue as it is
RESERVES
Bituminous Coal (Reserve Base) (Tons) (1979)' 34,200,000,000
Petroleum (BBLS) (Dec. 1981)' 36,000,000
Natural Gas (mcf) (Dec. 1981)' 551,000,000
Natural Gas Liquids (BBLS) (Dec. 1982)' 25,000,000
Crushed Stone Abundant
Sand & Gravel Abundant
Ball Clay (tons) (Identified Resources) (1980)2 630,000,000
Fire Clay (tons) (Identified Resources) (1980)2 280,000,000
Fuller's Earth (tons) (Identified Res.) (1980)2 750,000,000
Miscellaneous Clays Abundant
Preliminary
2. Production includes only mines producing 10,000 tons or more; value is price at
mine.
'. Source: U.S. Department of Energy
. Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines
"' ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 180, at 17.
2 The exemption from local taxes under KRS § 132.200(11) and the 1/10 cent per
$100 value tax rate under § 132.020(5) apply only to coal. See Board of Supervisors v.
Superior Oil Corp., 276 S.W. 527 (Ky. 1925) (holding oil and gas leases subject to
taxation at their fair cash value); Lewis, Is a Lease for Oil and Gas Mining Purposes
for a Term of Years Realty or Personalty, 21 Ky. L.J. 188 (1932-33).
"I As many in the oil and gas business can prove with their "dry holes", the
existence of oil or gas under a given tract of land can only be conclusively established
by drilling a test well. Other minerals, though not as elusive as oil and gas, are not
adequately mapped nor is their commercial value easily determinable.
,' See generally ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 180.
,, At least in theory, shale oil deposits are currently subject to ad valorum tax.
Since H.B. 92 § 1(18) (1984) defines taxable unmined minerals as those "for which there
exists a method of extraction ... in common usage in the industry and a commercial use
for which the mined mineral could be devoted," it is arguable that H.B. 92 would create
an exemption from tax for oil shale and tar sands. See Note, Taxation of Unmined
Minerals: Is It Inevitable, or Is It Unconstitutional?, 1 J. MiN. L. & POL'VY 97, 120
(1985).
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now, i.e., properties being actively mined will be subject to tax
on their fair cash value and other reserves will not be assessed.
VIII. WHO PAYS THE TAX ON UNMINED COAL
If the mineral estate has not been severed from the surface
estate, liability for the tax on unmined minerals would fall upon
the fee simple owner of the property.1 6 On the other hand, if
the mineral estate has been severed from the surface estate by a
Broad Form Deed or other conveyance of the mineral estate,
the owner of the severed mineral estate would be liable for the
tax on the unmined minerals. However, as previously discussed,
the value of both the mineral estate and the surface estate would
be affected by a power in the surface owner to prevent strip
mining, at least for unmined coal which was suitable for strip
mining. 8 7 Also, the value of the surface estate and the mineral
estate could be affected by the agricultural and horticultural
valuation provisions.
More difficult problems are encountered where the mineral
estate is leased to an operator with the reservation of a per ton
royalty on coal extracted. Kentucky courts have held that both
the reserved royalty and the leasehold estate are taxable prop-
erties.188 Furthermore, in Commonwealth v. Elkhorn-Piney Coal
Min. Co., '89 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a coal
mining leasehold and its appurtenances are real estate for pur-
poses of property taxation. Although a leasehold estate is taxable
as real estate, the owners of the leasehold estate (lessees) are not
liable for ad valorem taxes on unmined coal. The lessees are
only taxable on the value of their mining lease and the improve-
ments thereon, where title to the coal is not vested in the lessees
until after the coal is mined.'90 Since title to the coal would be
"6 But see supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (a discussion of agricultural
and horticultural value as a defacto exemption from the unmined minerals tax). In West
Virginia, there is a presumption that the owner of the surface owns the minerals unless
he can prove otherwise.
,' See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
"u Board of Supervisors v. Superior Oil Corp., 276 S.W. 527 (Ky. 1925); Swiss Oil
Corp.v. Shanks, 270 S.W. 478 (Ky. 1925); Moss v. Board of Supervisors, 263 S.W. 368
(Ky. 1924); Commonwealth v. Garrett, 260 S.W. 379 (Ky. 1924).
9 43 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1931).
, Head v. Little, 226 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1950).
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in the owner of the reserved royalty (lessor), it is the lessor who
would be liable to the state for the tax on the unmined coal.'
91
Of course, the parties to a coal lease could provide by
contract in their lease that as between the lessor and lessee, the
lessee would be responsible for and pay any taxes on unmined
coal in the leased tract. In Head v. Little, the lessee was held
not liable for the tax on unmined minerals, since his lease
provided that he would "[p]ay ... all taxes ...of any name,
nature and kind whatsoever ... on any coal that may be pro-
duced on the leased premises."' 9
The Kentucky statutes which exempt unmined coal from local
taxation' 93 and which place a 1/10 cent state tax rate on unmined
coal' 94 apply to "unmined coal and any interest therein, in
whatever form held, including, but not limited to, leasehold and
royalty interests."' 95 It might appear that the exemption of leasehold
estates from property tax goes beyond an exemption from unmined
minerals tax since the owner of the leasehold estate is not liable
for unmined minerals tax.' 96 However, the value of the unmined
coal subject to a lease is reflected in both the reserved royalty and
the leasehold estate. In effect, the value of the unmined coal may
be divided between these two interests, i.e., the value of the reserved
royalty is equal to the present value of the future stream of royalty
payments which will be generated by production of coal and the
value of the leasehold interest (in excess of the value of leasehold
improvements) equals the present value of the future profits (net
of royalties and costs of production) which will be generated by
the production and sale of coal. This amount should equal what
a willing buyer would pay for the leasehold interest (in addition
to what he would pay for the value of improvements to the
leasehold estate).
,9, In West Virginia, the value of property classified as "active mining property"
is determined by multiplying the royalty rate (if possible, the royalty rate of other
leasehold transactions in the same county) times a multiplier (set annually by the W.
Va. Dept. of Revenue). See Dutton & Bratton, supra note 53.
'91 Head, 226 S.W.2d at 324 (Emphasis added.)
,.3 KRS § 132.200(11) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
KRS § 132.020(5) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
," See supra notes 193-94.
"9 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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It would be unconstitutional to tax the owner of the reserved
royalty interest on more than the fair cash value of his reserved
royalty interest, i.e., it would be unconstitutional to value the
reserved royalty interest as being equal to the value of the
unmined minerals in the ground since the value of the minerals
in the ground may be much more or much less than the value
of the property owned, the reserved royalty interest. 197 The re-
served royalty interest (plus a reversion in the event of default
by the lessee) is the property owned by the lessor and is the
property which must be valued.' 98
Similarly, the leasehold estate is the property owned by the
lessee and is the property which must be valued to determine his
tax liability. However, the value of the reserved royalty and the
value of the leasehold estate may be affected by fluctuations in
the value of the unmined minerals. Presumably, at the time a
lease is executed, the present value of the reserved royalty rights
and other payments to the lessor will equal the value of the
unmined minerals.' 99 Thus, the entire burden of the tax will be
on the owner of the reserved royalty. The value of the lessee's
leasehold estate, at the time of execution of the lease, should be
zero if the royalty is fair. 200
As time passes after the execution of the lease, the value of
the unmined coal subject to the lease may increase or decrease
" KY. CONST. § 172 requires that property be valued at its "fair cash value" which
is the price it would bring at a voluntary sale.
,-' The discussion in the text assumes that the royalty rate set by the parties was
bona fide and not the product of collusion between the lessor and lessee, as where, for
example, the lessor and lessee are related parties and they have set the royalty rate
unreasonably high or low to shift income to one or the other of them. Cases involving
setting of the value of an interest in a closely held business for Federal estate tax
purposes through the use of a buy-sell agreement appear to be relevant in determining
the bona fides of the royalty rate set in the above situation. This analysis also leads one
to conclude that the West Virginia practice of valuing the reserved royalty interest on
the basis of royalty rates on comparable properties (rather than the actual royalty rate
on the property to be valued), would be unconstitutional in Kentucky because it would
not represent the price at which the actual reserved royalty could be sold in a voluntary
sale, but represents the current value of the entire interest in the unmined minerals. See
supra text accompanying note 190.
'- The value of unmined minerals is the fair cash value which would be realized
on a voluntary sale of the unmined minerals.
" Of course, the leasehold estate might have some 'value representing acquisition
costs, bonuses or prepayments.
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due to factors other than physical depletion of the coal reserves.
These fluctuations in value may affect the value of the reserved
royalty or the value of the leasehold estate or both. If unmined
coal decreases in value, the value of the leasehold estate would
probably decrease, especially if the royalty to be paid by the
lessee was a fixed rate per ton. If the value of the unmined coal
increases, the value of the leasehold estate would probably in-
crease because now the fixed royalty rate represents a bargain
purchase. Although the primary effect of changes in the value
of unmined coal will be on the lessee, it is possible that such a
change in value of the unmined coal could impact on the value
of the reserved royalty, e.g., to the extent a change in value of
the unmined coal accelerates or decelerates mining out the coal
and payment of royalties to the lessor.
Under the above analysis, the economic burden of the un-
mined minerals tax may be shared by the lessor and the lessee
of the minerals. Each would pay property tax on a share of the
value of the unmined coal reflected in valuing their respective
interests. Even though the lessor is the legal owner of the un-
mined coal according to Kentucky law, through the lease he has
given the lessee an economic interest in the unmined coal and
taxation must reflect these economic realities.
IX. ECONOMIC INCIDENCE OF THE TAX ON UNMINED COAL
A. Owners and Lessors of Mineral Interests
Although the owner of fee title to lands containing coal or
to unmined minerals pays the property tax on those minerals,
can the owner shift the burden of the tax to the lessee through
a lease? Prevailing economic theory is that the owner cannot
shift the tax burden to others. 20 Assuming a competitive market,
the present value of his reserved royalties under any lease the
owner executes in an arms-length, bona-fide transaction could
not exceed the fair market value of the unmined minerals. Once
enacted, the tax burden would be capitalized into the value of
unmined coal, causing an almost immediate decline in the value
of unmined coal.
20, See, e.g., A. M. CHURCH, TAXATION OF NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES 107 (1981).
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For example, assume that a coal deposit, currently de facto
exempt from property tax, is estimated to be mineable over the
next 20 years and is worth $100,000, i.e., the present discounted
value of the after-tax stream of income which the coal will
produce over the next 20 years is $100,000. Further assume that
an unmined coal tax is enacted subjecting unmined coal to
property tax at the rate of 70 cents per $100 value. Thus, the
owner of the unmined coal will have to pay property taxes of
about $700 on his coal in the current year. As the coal is depleted
from the ground each year, the value of the unmined coal will
decline as will the property tax payable. Thus, assume that over
the 20 year period the owner will pay a total of $8000 in property
taxes on this unmined coal. 202 The present value of the unmined
coal must be discounted after enactment of the property tax to
reflect these future property tax liabilities. The present value of
the $8,000 in future property tax payments must be subtracted
from the $100,000 before-tax value of the unmined coal in order
to determine the present value of the coal deposit immediately
after enactment of the property tax. 23
In summary, assuming that the demand for coal will remain
elastic and that there is a competitive market for unmined coal,
2°4
the burden of the property tax paid by the mineral owner will
fall on the mineral owner and he will not be able to shift any
substantial portion of that burden to labor, consumers, or op-
erators. The tax burden on the mineral owner will decrease the
value of his mineral interest. This decline in the value of the
coal deposits could increase if proposed changes in the Federal
Income Tax law are enacted.
B. The Lessee of Unmined Minerals
The value of a leasehold estate where the lease provides for
a fixed per ton royalty, will increase in value if the value of
22 Taxes each year would decrease as the value of the property decreases due to
mining.
101 The exact amount of the tax in the first year depends on the value of the
unmined coal and the value of the unmined coal in the first year depends on the amount
of tax, requiring the use of simultaneous equations to determine the exact amount of
tax and exact value of the unmined coal.
Arguably, if the unmined coal is owned by a Utility Company, such company
might be able to pass through the additional tax to its consumers.
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unmined coal increases after the execution of his lease. 2 5 Thus,
the lessee will pay property tax on such increase in value of his
leasehold estate, assuming that present law exemptions are re-
pealed or held unconstitutional. Furthermore, the lessee/opera-
tor cannot shift this tax burden to consumers, because the demand
for coal is elastic and any price increase by one group of pro-
ducers will result in a proportionate reduction in the demand
for coal supplied by that group. Thus, the additional tax costs
could not be passed on to consumers, again assuming competi-
tive markets, i.e., that the operator is not selling the coal under
a long-term, cost plus contract and that the operator is not a
utility company.
However, the operator may be able to shift the additional
tax costs to labor and the lessor. Whether the operator can shift
these tax costs to labor depends on the relative bargaining power
of the operator and labor. Significant factors to be considered
include whether labor is unionized, what the unemployment rate
is, and how mobile the labor force is. Even though the lessee is
tied by his present contract to fixed royalty rates, it is possible
in the long-run to shift some of this tax burden to lessors of
unmined coal. One simulation of tax incidence predicts that a
10 percent change in the tax on output (like a tax on the lessee-
operator) would be shifted equally between labor and lessors of
mineral interests with only about a one percent increase in prices
to consumers.2 °6
C. Estimated Revenues from Tax on Unmined Coal
Estimates of the revenue which would be produced by a tax
on unmined coal depend on assumptions regarding the structure
of the tax imposed and the manner of its administration. At




The Moore decision that the 1/10 cent state tax rate on unmined
coal constitutes an unconstitutional de facto exemption of un-
205 See supra text accompanying note 199.
CHURCH, supra note 201.
County, city and school district.
KRS § 132.200(11) (Cum. Supp. 1984); Ky. CONST. § 171.
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mined coal from state property tax2°9 does not subject unmined
coal to local property taxes. On the other hand, HB 92 would
repeal KRS section 132.200(11), the provision which currently
exempts unmined coal from local taxation. Under HB 92, un-
mined coal would be subject to state property tax at the general
rate applicable to real property and would also be subject to
local property taxation.
Local tax rates vary, thus subjecting unmined coal in differ-
ent locations to differing tax burdens. For estimating purposes,
a local tax rate of 42 cents per $100 of value is assumed in
addition to the state tax rate of 22 cents per $100210 or a total
property tax burden of 64 cents per $100 of value. Of course,
if unmined coal were to continue to be exempt from local taxes,
the total tax burden would be only 22 cents per $100 of value.
If unmined coal were exempt from state taxation and only
subject to local taxation as occurs in many states taxing unmined
coal,2 1" ' the total tax burden would be approximately 42 cents
per $100 of value.
To estimate revenues from a tax on unmined coal, it is
necessary to estimate the total market value of unmined coal in
Kentucky which would be subject to the tax. From the measured
coal resources of 64 billion tons, 2 12 it is necessary to determine
how much of this coal would be subject to the tax. Assuming
that coal under rivers, barns and state parks will produce neg-
ligible revenue and further assuming that special farm valuation 21 3
and/or the Broad Form Deed consent requirement for strip
mining21 4 will further reduce coal reserves taxable at anything
near fair cash value, it is necessary to estimate the amount of
property thus de facto exempted from the tax. It is probably
not unreasonable to estimate that 50% of the estimated coal
reserves are now or would soon be exempt under one of the
zo Moore v. Gillis, No. 84-CI-0867, slip op. (Ky. Franklin Cir. Ct. filed July 10,
1985).
2,o 1984 rates under the roll-back provision.
2,"Of the states that tax unmined coal, the majority tax only on the local
level .. " Dutton & Bratton, supra note 53, at 18.
"I Kentucky Geological Survey, Kentucky Coal Reserves, Ky. Coal J., Aug. 1985,
at 3 (total measured, indicated and estimated coal reserves).
23 See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
1" See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
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above "exemptions" from meaningful tax, leaving 32 billion
tons subject to the tax.
Of the 32 billion taxable tons remaining, it is necessary to
estimate how much is recoverable through mining. A rate of
90% for strip mining and 50% for deep mining is reasonable,
but such recovery rates are arguably high to apply to all the
remaining reserves of unmined coal in the state for purposes of
a taxing statute. Persons view recovery rates differently when
selling coal reserves than when self-assessing their property for
tax purposes. Since approximately one-half of Kentucky's coal
could be strip mined and one-half could be deep mined, a
recovery rate of 70% and a tax recovery rate of 50% appear
reasonable. Applying the 50% recovery rate to the 32 billion
tons of "non-exempt" coal reserves leaves 16 billion tons of
recoverable, taxable coal.
Next, an average value per ton of coal in the ground must
be ascertained in order to estimate the fair cash value of the 16
billion tons of recoverable coal. Although 50 cents per ton is
the figure most commonly used in valuing coal in the ground,
215
West Virginia's experience in implementing a property tax on
unmined coal similar to HB 92 was that "effective value per ton
. . ranged from 3.0 cents to 21.7 cents per ton" with a median
value of 13.0 cents per ton. 216 Assuming a 25 cents per ton
average value for Kentucky coal, the fair cash value of unmined
coal in Kentucky would be assessed at $4 billion.
Applying the state property tax rate (22 cents/$100) and the
estimated local rates (42 cents/$100) produces total tax revenues
of $25.6 million per year.2 17 Almost nine million in state revenues
and $16.8 million in local revenues would be generated.2 18 These
See, e.g., Virginia Wilson, Economic Analysis of a Proposed Property Tax on
Unmined Minerals in Kentucky, Occasional paper No.1 at 15 (Jan. 1983). Note also that
the value of unmined coal would decline with enactment of a tax on unmined coal.
Further reductions in value could result from Federal income tax changes.
", Dutton & Bratton, supra note 53, at 32.
2 It should be noted that not all counties will share equally in these new revenues:
15 counties would get about 80074 of the local revenues; 5 counties would get about 40070
of the local taxes. The 15 counties are: Breathitt, Floyd, Harlan, Henderson, Hopkins,
Knott, Leslie, Letcher, McLean, Martin, Muhlenberg, Perry, Pike, Union and Webster.
The 5 counties are: Henderson, Hopkins, Pike, Union and Webster.
2I These estimates are based upon the following calculations:
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estimates can be compared with the West Virginia experience as
one test of validity. With a similar unmined coal base, about
100 billion tons, assessment at 60% of value and a tax rate
averaging 2.24%, West Virginia collected $11.2 million in taxes
on unmined minerals in 1982.219
Others have arrived at very different estimates of the current
taxable value of Kentucky's in ground coal. 220 A small increase
in the average per ton value or non-exemption of coal under the
farm land valuation provision or unconstitutionality of the Broad
Form Deed, could have a fairly substantial effect on the $25.6
million revenue estimate.
D. Secondary Revenue Effects
A tax on unmined coal could have significant effects on
severance tax collections, 221 sales tax revenues and state income
taxes. Such secondary revenue effects would be directly related
to increases or decreases in coal production which would cause
increases or decreases in employment in Kentucky. If coal pro-
duction increased, severance tax collections, employment, sales
tax revenues and income tax revenues would increase. If coal
production decreased, severance tax collections, employment,
sales tax revenues and income tax revenues would decrease.
Estimated Revenues from Unmined Minerals Tax
Measured reserves ....................... 64 billion tons
less: de facto exempt .................... 32 billion tons
Subject to tax reserves ................... 32 billion tons
times: recovery rate ..................... 50%
Taxable Reserves ....................... 16 billion tons
times:25 cents/ton value ................. 25 cents
Market Value of Unmined Coal .......... $4 billion
times: 22 cent state tax rate .............. $8.8 million
42 cent local tax rate .................... 16.8 million
TOTAL REVENUES GENERATED ...... $25.6 million
Note: This total is not adjusted for the 96% collection rate on real property taxes or
the estimated costs of administration of the tax ($500,000).
29 S. Clark, Memorandum, Statutory Incidence of an Unmined Minerals Tax 2
(Oct. 31, 1983).
110 E.g., Gilmore Dutton - $8.2 billion; Virginia Wilson - $16.375 billion at 50%
recovery rate; Fair Tax Coalition - $22.4 billion at 50% recovery rate.
"' Severance Tax Collections for the calendar year 1984 were $211,232,276. Ky.
Coal J., Nov. 1985, at 43.
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The beneficial effects of increased coal production and em-
ployment would be enhanced by the multiplier effect. The coal
industry provides a substantial portion of the state's total earn-
ings and labor force.22 2 However, due to a weak link between
the coal industry and the rest of the economy, the multiplier
effect is rather small. 23 Thus, a mining operation in Harlan County
has little impact on the Kentucky economy outside of Harlan
County.
On a regional level, the coal industry can have a significant
impact. This is especially true in Eastern Kentucky where "[t]he
coal industry directly produces more than half of the gross
regional product and one fourth of private sector employment.
As a result, fluctuations in the demand for coal ... produce
marked impact upon the coal counties. 2 24 Thus, "[i]f the export
demand for coal increases by 5 percent annually over the his-
torical rate of growth," employment in the area could be ex-
pected to increase 4.8 percent.
22
Whether imposition of a property tax on unmined coal would
cause an increase or a decrease in coal production (in comparison
to coal production in the absence of such tax), depends upon
the identity of the group which bears the burden of the tax.
There are, in general, three groups that may find themselves
ultimately saddled with the burden imposed by a tax on unmined
coal. They are the owners of the unmined coal, the coal opera-
tors and the consumers of coal.
If the tax burden were on the owners of unmined coal,
owners would be induced to "mine out from under the tax
burden," i.e., reduce the amount of taxable property as quickly
as possible by severing it from the earth, and thereby avoiding
future taxes. Owners would be motivated to accept lower roy-
12 For example, data provided by the Kentucky Economics Information System
shows that, in 1984, coal wages and salaries alone were 5.770 of total wages and salaries
in Kentucky.
2 1 J. ABELL, KENTUCKY ENERGY CABINET, AN ANALYSIS OF ENERGY RELATED
MULTIPLIERS IN KENTUCKY 19 (Aug. 1983).
224 Sherafat, Pagoulatos & Anschel, The Exploitation of Coal as an Engine for
Growth in Eastern Kentucky - An Input-Output Study, 10 S.J. AGRIC. ECON. 81, 85
(1978).
225 Id. Because of the recent trend toward greater mechanization of the coal mining
process, the 4.8% employment increase may be slightly optimistic.
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alties in order to induce mining of their coal. 226 This apparent
anomaly of increased costs resulting in increased production is
explainable by the fact that the increased tax costs to the owner
results in lower royalty costs to the lessee-coal producer. Since
future values of coal are speculative, 227 owners of coal might be
tempted to mine out from under the tax for extremely low
royalties or even abandon their coal properties, but such drastic
results have apparently not occurred in other states which have
imposed property taxes on unmined coal.
Although short term consequences of saddling owners with
the tax burden of an unmined minerals tax would likely accel-
erate coal production, there are several arguments that such a
tax burden would result in long term decreases in coal produc-
tion. First, owners would delay exploration, for such exploration
could lead to an increase in an owner's coal reserves and con-
sequently an increase in his tax liability. 228 However, since coal
reserves in Kentucky are extensively mapped and, for the most
part, already owned, the impact of the tax on exploration is
likely to be negligible.
Secondly, it is arguable that there would be a tendency for
owners to delay opening new mines to avoid reclassification of
reserves from inactive to active reserves. Because of the signifi-
cantly lower tax rate on inactive reserves, there would be a
tendency to completely mine out existing coal reserves before
opening a new tract.
Third, short-term overproduction of coal would cause coal
prices to decline because of the elasticity of demand for coal.
Thus, some coal which could economically be mined at the price
at the original level of supply would not be economically mine-
able at the lower price level resulting from the increased supply
"I See V. Wilson, infra, note 229, at 9-13 (citing A. CHURCH, TAXATION OF NON-
RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1981)). Counteracting this financial motivation to lower royalties
for economic reasons would be the psychological justification to raise royalties to recover
the new tax burden. Presumably, economic realities would prevail over feelings of
fairness.
227 Although coal prices may increase as the supply dwindles, coal prices could
decline precipitously with the development of a cheap, safe alternate energy source, e.g.,
from hydrogen, solar, shale oil or nuclear fuels.
' CHURCH, supra note 201, at 75.
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of coal.2 29 Thus, there would be a tendency to prematurely
abandon costly mines, leaving coal reserves which are not likely
to be mined in the future because of high start-up costs. 230 As
coal supplies are exhausted, presumably the original price levels
would be restored, but it may take some time to restore the
prior level of capital investment in coal mining.
Some of the burden of tax on unmined minerals can be
expected to rest upon operators for either of two reasons. First,
if the coal lease provides that the operator is liable for all
taxes,23' then the tax might be shifted to the operator, at least
under certain existing leases. Secondly, the operator's tax burden
could be increased due to increased value of his leasehold estate
resulting from rising coal prices and a fixed royalty rate under
his lease.
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If the tax burden were on the operator, the operator might
accelerate production on existing leases to reduce the tax burden
and might shift future production to other states in which pro-
duction costs (including tax burdens) were lower. For the oper-
ator, his share of the burden of the unmined minerals tax would
be similar in effect to an additional severance tax, i.e., an
additional production cost. One estimate of such a tax, at a rate
of 60 cents per $100 value of unmined coal (value at 16 cents
per ton), assuming the tax burden capitalized at 15% was shifted
to the operator, would have the following impact on Kentucky
coal production:
1985
Eastern Ky. coal production .... 320,000 ton decrease
Western Ky. coal production ........ No change 1990
Eastern Ky. coal production .... 290,000 ton decrease
Western Ky. coal production. .2,940,000 ton decrease
233
V. Wilson, Economic Analysis of a Proposed Property Tax on Unmined Min-
erals in Kentucky 8-9 (Jan. 1983) (The Appalachian Center Student Internship Program,
Occasional Paper Series No. 1).
11 Id. at 9. The tendency to delay opening new reserves to avoid reclassification
as active reserves may offset this tendency to premature abandonment of existing mines.
" See supra text accompanying note 192.
232 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
233 R. Sims, An Analysis of Coal Production Impacts Resulting from a Property
Tax on That Mineral 3 (n.d.).
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Because of the elasticity of demand for coal, it is fair to
assume that the burden of a property tax on unmined coal
cannot be shifted to consumers, except in a few limited situa-
tions, e.g., unmined coal owned by a public utility company
whose rates reflect costs plus a reasonable profit.
Since more than 50% of Kentucky's unmined coal is likely
owned by non-residents, 234 and about 85% of Kentucky's coal is
exported, a substantial portion of the burden of a tax on un-
mined coal, that which falls on owners or consumers, would be
exported. To the extent that the burden of the tax falls on coal
operators, the burden may fall on Kentucky residents.
Conclusion
Is the accurate evaluation of unmined coal impossible or is
a "rough, educated guess" a better valuation than zero value?
Does immediate imposition of the estimated future tax burden
on the current coal owner (through reduction in the present
value of his unmined coal) justify special treatment for unmined
coal? Should it matter whether or not most unmined coal is
owned by foreign corporations whose stock is owned mainly by
non-residents of Kentucky? Should small or large landowners be
exempted from the tax because their surface estate qualifies for
agricultural or horticultural exemption? Should surface estate
owners be exempted from the tax if they do not own the mineral
estate, even though the surface estate owner might be able to
obtain a larger royalty for consenting to strip mining than the
mineral estate owner could obtain for leasing his mineral estate?
Should a possible net loss in state revenues, e.g., greater decrease
in severance tax, sales tax and income tax collections than in-
crease in state property tax revenues justify not subjecting val-
uable property to property tax? Does it matter that most of the
property tax revenues generated, if unmined coal is subjected to
local taxation, would go to a few counties and local school
districts? These and other value choices emerge from the legal-
economic analysis of imposition of property taxes on unmined
'3 See Wilson, supra note 229, at 13; H. Caudill, A Position Statement Taxation
of Unmined Coal Reserves in Kentucky, 2 (Dec. 12, 1983) (copies mailed to Kentucky
Unmined Minerals Tax Advisory Commission).
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coal. Legislators, trying to decide whether or not to change the
property tax scheme for unmined coal and other minerals must
make these value choices.

